The Future of South Asia: Population Dynamics, Economic Prospects, and Regional Coherence by David E. Bloom & Larry Rosenberg
 
 
 PROGRAM ON THE GLOBAL 








The Future of South Asia:  





















The views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the 
Harvard Initiative for Global Health. The Program on the Global Demography of Aging receives 
funding from the National Institute on Aging, Grant No. 1 P30 AG024409-06. 
 The Future of South Asia:  
Population Dynamics, Economic Prospects, and Regional Coherence 
  







What do we foresee for South Asia
2
In addition, as we will see, there are some similar demographic trends across the 
countries of South Asia, but there are also a number of  extreme differences. Regional 
heterogeneity bears on the question, “to what extent is South Asia a coherent region?”  
 in 2060, in light of the significant changes it has undergone 
in the past few decades? India has experienced rapid economic growth, but continues to suffer 
widespread, extreme poverty as well. Afghanistan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka have seen major 
conflicts, with Pakistan always seeming on the verge of a major eruption. Nepal and Sri Lanka 
finally seem to have moved toward peace. As elsewhere, the region’s many developments and 
crosscurrents make reliable predictions difficult, but one relatively neglected set of factors – 
demographic change – may shed some light on the region’s future. Throughout the world, falling 
mortality rates and declining birth rates have been predictive of growing per-capita incomes, and 
theoretical reasoning and related evidence are sufficiently compelling to think that the links may 
indeed be causal.  In this vein, this essay explores South Asia’s economic prospects through a 
demographic lens.  
 
The current demographic scene 
Demographically, South Asia is a diverse region of 1.64 billion people (24 percent of the world’s 
population). The infant mortality rate (IMR – the number of children under age 1 who die in a 
given year out of 1,000 children born in that year) varies by an order of magnitude, from 152 in 
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Afghanistan to 15 in Sri Lanka. The total fertility rate (TFR – the average number of children a 
woman of childbearing age will have assuming no change in current age-specific rates) ranges 
from a high of about 6.5 in Afghanistan to a low of 2.0 in Maldives. Life expectancy at birth (the 
average age at death of those born in a given year, assuming no change in age-specific mortality 
rates) is three decades higher in Sri Lanka (74.5) than in Afghanistan (44.5). The population 
growth rate also shows dramatic differences across countries: from 3.3  percent  per year in 
Afghanistan (a doubling time of about 21 years) to 0.8 percent per year in Sri Lanka (a doubling 
time of nearly 90 years). And most obviously, the countries of South Asia vary by size from 
India (1.2 billion) to the Maldives (300,000), which is one four-thousandth as large.
3
The demographic circumstances prevailing in South Asia today reflect the changes that 
have occurred as part of South Asia’s demographic transition: the shift from high rates of 
mortality and fertility to low ones. These changes have been dramatic. For example, the regional 
average IMR fell from 168 per 1,000 in the early 1950s to 53 today. TFR began to decline soon 
after the onset of IMR decline, with the regional average going from 5.9 children per woman in 
the late 1960s to 2.8 today. Life expectancy, which averaged 39 years in the early 1950s, has 
risen to nearly 65 years today. The region’s total population has more than tripled since 1950, 
when it stood at 481 million. 
  
Many countries exhibit a similar pattern to that of South Asia, in which improvements in 
child survival (due for example to increased access to safe water, sanitation, and healthcare), 
subsequently lead to lower fertility, as families begin to see that fewer children are needed to 
achieve target family size. (In addition, numerous other factors influence family size. For 
example, women’s increased educational attainment has a powerful effect, as do women’s 
increased opportunities in the labor market. Increased urbanization – which takes place as people 
move from rural to urban areas, as rural areas grow to become urban, and as urban areas expand 
to encompass formerly rural areas – brings greater economic opportunities for both men and 
women, and the consequent increased economic value of people’s time leads to lower fertility.) 
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The key point here, however, is that the initial mortality decline leads to a baby boom, since 
fewer babies die and because fertility has not yet fallen. 
 
Historical and current economic situation 
Consistent with widespread poverty in South Asia, gross domestic product (GDP)/capita in the 
region is low. At $2,484 in 2008 (in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms and constant 2005 
international dollars), the region lies at almost exactly half the income per person of the World 
Bank’s low- and middle-income countries. The economically best-off countries in the region are 
Maldives ($5,169), Bhutan ($4,395), and Sri Lanka ($4,215). In the second tier lie India ($2,721) 
and Pakistan ($2,344). Bangladesh ($1,233), Nepal ($1,020), and Afghanistan ($1,019) are by far 
the poorest. Beyond this diversity of incomes, there are also wide ranges of economic well-being 
within the various countries. 
Per capita income growth rates have varied dramatically across countries and over time. 
Figure 1 shows these growth rates for South Asia and individual countries. The region as a whole 
has been growing faster economically since the 1980s, a fact that is heavily affected by India’s 
high share (74 percent  in 2010) of South Asia’s population, coupled with India’s economic 
growth trajectory. South Asia’s GDP per capita growth was low in the 1970s, higher in the 1980s 
and 1990s, and higher still in the 2000s. 
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Figure 1 

























































Source: World Bank 2010 
Note: Figures are exchange-rate based. A similar pattern appears if PPP figures are used, but the PPP data are not 
available before 1980. Data for Afghanistan are not sufficiently available to show changes over time. 
 
Changing age structure 
One consequence of the demographic transition is population growth, which (setting immigration 
aside) occurs when births exceed deaths. The region was growing at 1.8 percent annually in the 
early 1950s but sped up to a peak of 2.4 percent annually in the late 1970s. Since then, its annual 
growth rate has declined to its current level of 1.5 percent. 
But population growth is not the only consequence of South Asia’s demographic 
transition. Another significant consequence is the change in the age structure of its population.  
This begins with the creation of the aforementioned baby boom, which quickly leads to a 
relatively large number of young people in the population. As fertility subsequently falls, the 
relative size of the “baby boom” generation is accentuated. With the passage of time, this cohort 
becomes a correspondingly large cohort of working-age adults. 
For reasons that will become clear below, an especially salient change in demographic 
indicators is the increase in the ratio of working-age to non-working-age population. For South 
Asia as a whole, this ratio stood at 1.43 in 1950 and fell to 1.22 by 1965 as infant and child 5 
mortality rates fell. Since then, it has risen steadily to 1.74, as the baby boom generation has 
moved into working ages and as fertility rates continue to fall. The ratio is expected to reach a 
peak of 2.2 working-age individuals for every non-working-age person in 2040, before beginning 
to decline. Table 1 shows the historical and expected evolution of this ratio over time. 
 
Table 1 
Ratio of working-age to non-working-age population 
 
  1970  2010  2050 
        SOUTH ASIA  1.24  1.74  2.08 
Afghanistan  1.16  1.08  1.73 
Bangladesh  1.10  1.87  2.02 
Bhutan  1.24  1.88  1.98 
India  1.26  1.80  2.13 
Maldives  1.16  2.17  1.91 
Nepal  1.23  1.50  2.13 
Pakistan  1.16  1.46  2.02 
Sri Lanka  1.31  2.12  1.57 
Source: United Nations 2009 
 
The countries of South Asia have, and will continue to experience, changes in age structure. 
Some countries in the region are very far along in their demographic transition: in Sri Lanka, for 
example, the working-age-to-non-working-age ratio reached its peak (2.2) in 2005. By contrast, 
Bangladesh is expected to peak at 2.3 in 2035, India at 2.3 in 2040, and Pakistan at 2.0 in 2045 
(see Figure 2). At the opposite end of the spectrum, Afghanistan can expect its ratio to still be 
climbing in 2050, when it will be 1.7. Of course, all of these estimates depend on the actual path 
of fertility rates, mortality rates, and life expectancy – patterns that are often subject to a range of 
factors, including government policies.  
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Figure 2 






























































Source: United Nations 2009 
 
Based on the demographic changes cited in the United Nations (UN) data, it is clear that the 
region will be very different demographically in 2050. With respect to age structure, our central 
measure of progress through the demographic transition, South Asia was quite homogeneous in 
1970, with the ratio shown in Figure 2 ranging only from 1.10 to 1.31. Today this ratio ranges 
from 1.08 to 2.17. UN projections for 2050 show ratios ranging from 1.57 to 2.13. That is, there 
will be some convergence across the countries of the region, but this will occur slowly.  
 
Linking demographic change and economic growth: the demographic dividend 
Understanding the significance of these demographic changes requires an examination of the 
economic history of the region. In  particular, the data shown above on the growth rate of 
GDP/capita are obviously relevant to a discussion of a possible interaction between demographic 
change and economic growth. 
Two facts stand out from the previous discussion:  
•  The ratio of the working-age to non-working age population in South Asia has been 
rising since 1965. 
•  The region’s GDP per capita has been rising during the last 30 years of this period. 
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Is there a connection? 
For many years, rapid population growth was thought to be detrimental to economic 
growth. Thomas Malthus hypothesized that a rapidly growing population would inevitably 
outstrip any society’s capacity to produce enough food, resulting in mass starvation and human 
misery. In the 1980s, a new idea, “population neutralism”, came to the fore. Adherents of this 
view marshaled evidence to show that population growth was neither helpful nor detrimental to 
economic growth. More recent studies (Bloom and Canning 2008; Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla 
2002) have focused on the possible effects on economic growth of the age structure of a 
population. This body of research has found that, ceteris paribus, cross-country differences in 
age structure tend to translate into cross-country differences in macroeconomic performance. 
Specifically, a rise in the ratio of working-age to non-working-age population corresponds, in 
general, to increases in the rate of per-capita economic growth. Roughly one-third of East Asia’s 
economic “miracle” may have come about because of the rapid demographic changes that the 
region has undergone (Bloom and Williamson 1998). Propelled by similar demographic changes, 
Ireland also benefited economically, becoming the “Celtic tiger” (Bloom and Canning 2003). 
This phenomenon has come to be known as the “demographic dividend”.  First, a baby boom 
cohort arises because of a decline in mortality rates that is followed, with a delay, by a decline in 
fertility rates. This relatively large cohort gradually enters the typical working ages – beginning 
when the leading edge of the baby boom enters its teens. A few decades later, the baby boom 
results in there being a disproportionately and historically large share of working-age individuals 
in a population – the pattern discussed above for South Asia. A rising, and relatively large, share 
of working-age people can be economically consequential because of the following factors: 
•  Labor force size. A rise in the share of working-age people means that a country’s 
productive capacity is larger than it was in the past.  
  A higher share of people working, and a correspondingly lower share of children, 
allows a country to increase its per-capita economic output.  
  The fact that there are fewer children per family allows more women to enter the 
workforce. Although women still bear a disproportionate burden of child-raising, 
they are nevertheless more likely to enter the workforce when there are fewer 
children to take care of. Women’s increased participation in the commercial 
economy can be highly significant in raising output per capita. Such participation 8 
is typically more possible and more remunerative than in the past because an 
increasing share of the population lives in urban areas, where earnings are higher 
than in rural areas. 
•  Savings. Savings may rise for two reasons, and increased savings are channeled into 
increased investment via the financial system. 
  A preponderance of working-age people can lead to increased savings rates, 
because this age group saves more than the young or the old.  
  Because the demographic transition is accompanied by longer lifespans, workers 
also have an incentive to save more, in anticipation of longer periods of 
retirement. 
•  Changed use of capital. At both the family and the national level, resources can be 
redirected to spur economic growth. 
  Families with fewer children can spend more on the health and education of each 
child without increasing their total expenses. Healthier children attend school 
more regularly, learn more while there, and are poised to become more productive 
workers. 
  At the national level, there are relatively fewer children to feed, clothe, and 
educate. Even with continued construction of schools, a higher share of financial 
resources can be directed toward investments that yield returns in the short run via 
the creation of greater physical capital –  factories, roads, and other types of 
infrastructure. 
 
Caveat lector: Demography is not destiny  
Realization of a demographic dividend, via the mechanisms listed above, is far from automatic. 
A country’s ability to capture the dividend depends on many factors and policies: 
•  Productive employment is  the  key. An economy can grow even if employment is 
stagnant, but inclusive economic growth, i.e., growth that benefits all sectors of society, 
requires the implementation of policies and practices that draw a large portion of the 
working-age population into the labor force. If large numbers of working-age people are 
unemployed, they will constitute an economic burden on those who do have jobs. 9 
Moreover, high unemployment or underemployment can become a major source  of 
discontent.  
•  Particularly important is a country’s ability to nurture its human capital. An educated 
labor force is much more likely to be able to work productively and to be able to adapt to 
the rapidly changing demands of an ever more global economy. Similarly, a healthy 
workforce will be more productive, and it may be better able to attract foreign direct 
investment. 
•  Carefully chosen and well-implemented policies and practices in other areas, such as 
governance, macroeconomic management, trade, and social protection, are essential.  
•  Good relations with neighboring countries, trading partners, and international institutions 
are important. Tense relations often lead to high military expenditures – and even wars – 
that detract from investments in physical or human capital that can more directly benefit 
the population at large. 
•  Internal peace is usually important for economic growth. Without it, a country will have a 
more difficult time ensuring a high level of employment. 
 
To date, South Asia’s economies have been improving, in response to many factors, quite 
possibly including the region’s rising share of working-age people. Based on the East Asian 
experience, the fact that South Asia is soon to see a further rise in the share of working-age 
people augurs well for increased per-capita incomes in the coming decades. To be clear, this 
prediction is an “all-things-equal” statement. Demographic change may well operate as a 
significant factor in strengthening the region’s economies, but (a) policies need to be in place to 
ensure widespread productive employment, and (b) factors completely apart from demographics 
may of course play a decisive role. 
 
Two potential impediments to realizing the demographic dividend 
Within-country heterogeneity.  Considerations similar to those discussed above apply within 
countries. The various states of India, for example, lie at very different points along the 
demographic transition (see Figure 3). The demographic heterogeneity of these states suggests 
that their future economic trajectories may differ  significantly from each other. Thus, 
demographic heterogeneity may undermine the inclusivity of economic growth. In Indian states, 10 
as in the countries of the region, policies will need to be focused on specific measures that can 
promote productive employment.  
 
Figure 3 













Source: Office of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner, Ministry of Home Affairs, India, 2001, as shown 
in Bloom 2011 forthcoming. 
 
Population aging. One further factor, population aging, is inherent to the demographic transition 
and potentially complicates the posited relationship between demographic change and economic 
growth. As the baby boom cohort reaches the upper end of the working ages, its leading edge 
begins to swell the ranks of the elderly. In conjunction with increased life expectancy, the end of 
this cohort’s working years leads to there being an increasing share of the population that is 
elderly, not working, and dependent on the working-age population. Continued low fertility also 
contributes to the elderly representing a rising share of the population. The share of the region’s 
population that is aged 60 or older stood at around 6 percent from 1950 through 1995. By 2010 it 
had reached 7 percent, and it is expected to reach nearly 19 percent by 2050. The countries of the 
region are aging at very different rates: Sri Lanka’s 60+ population share is expected to increase 
from 12 percent to 28 percent over the next 40 years, Bangladesh’s from 6 percent to 21 percent, 
India’s from 8 percent to 20 percent, and Pakistan’s from 6 percent to 15 percent. The share of 
those aged 80 or older is expected to rise from 0.6 percent in 2010 to 2.4 percent in 2050. This 
segment of the population is very unlikely to be working – and thus they are in general not 11 
contributing economically to the family or to the national economy. In general, their needs are 
much greater and more acute than those of the 60-79 group.  
Population aging is a concern for various reasons. In South Asia, as elsewhere, traditional 
patterns of family care of the elderly are fraying – because of smaller families, more years 
between generations, women working more, movement to urban areas leaving the elderly 
behind, and changes in social expectations. The elderly, who are often not able to support 
themselves and who most often have limited or no pensions, are financially dependent on others. 
Their contribution to economic output is greatly decreased. Although retirement policies have 
mostly so far been inapplicable to populations that are working primarily in the informal sector, 
countries will need to rethink such policies, with a view to expanding pension coverage to a 
greater share of the population. 
In addition, the elderly need greater access to healthcare, just at the time when their 
financial security is typically becoming worse. The strengthening of healthcare institutions and 
delivery that most countries need to accomplish is even more pressing in light of population 
aging. In the last few decades, several newly prominent factors have begun to affect population 
health, including the health of the elderly. Diets in many countries have become less healthy, as 
the availability of processed and packaged foods expands. Urban living, because of a 
combination of pollution, slums, and in some instances an increase in sedentary jobs, is 
encouraging a significant increase in obesity and related chronic disease. Furthermore, the need 
to respond to chronic diseases comes while many developing countries are still dealing with the 
unfinished agenda of conquering infectious diseases.  
 
Conclusion 
Current demographic trends indicate that South Asia will be very different in the coming decades 
than it is today. Mortality and fertility rates will be lower, and life expectancy will be higher. 
Population growth will have slowed substantially. Of greatest note, the region’s ratio of working-
age to non-working-age population will have risen, peaked, and begun to fall. 
Economic predictions are much more difficult to make, as they depend on a much wider 
array of factors. But the coming demographic changes offer most of South Asia an opportunity to 
benefit from a demographic dividend. Policies that successfully promote productive employment 
are essential if this dividend is to be realized. Other factors are likely to play even larger roles in 12 
determining the region’s economic future, but attempting to take advantage of the 
demographically driven opportunity is a wise move –  especially because expanding work 
opportunities and enhancing the population’s health and education are beneficial in their own 
right and would be good policy choices even in the absence of a demographic spur. 
As the region’s economies improve, the relationship between demographic change and 
economic growth suggests that the various countries’ economic ranking within South Asia may 
change. Indeed, this has already happened. In 1980, India’s GDP per capita, in PPP terms, was 
only 73 percent as large as Pakistan’s. It stayed at roughly that level until the latter half of the 
1990s, standing at 89 percent of Pakistan’s level in 2000. By 2005, India had surpassed Pakistan 
by 2 percent, and in 2008, it was leading by 16 percent. The demographic comparison here is 
striking: India’s TFR has fallen much faster than Pakistan’s, and to a lower level (2.6 vs. 3.8). Its 
working-age to non-working age ratio began to rise earlier than did Pakistan’s (1970 vs. 1985), 
and it has reached a higher level (1.8 vs. 1.5). More generally, the countries of South Asia are 
somewhat out of phase with respect to their demographic trajectories, which will create a 
tendency for their economic trajectories to be out of phase. This raises the possibility of other 
income crossovers and corresponding reordering of economic power. 
It is apparent from this examination that there is considerable demographic and related 
economic heterogeneity both across countries and within them in South Asia. That heterogeneity 
has been and will continue to be a powerful driver of economic inequality. In addition, one might 
project that the lack of common circumstances suggests that South Asian leaders will continue to 
voice widely disparate interests. This poses a challenge to South Asia’s coherence as an 
economic and political power. 
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